The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited: 18 (Cambridge Middle East Studies, Series Number 18)

Morris became a leading "new historian" when he first published this book (c.1988?) but other Israelis were tolerant of what he'd done.Other historians followed and got themselves into really hot water, one of them being forced to leave the country. Still, Morris bravely updated this book in 2004 and I'd recommend everyone buy a copy while they're available.Under a barrage of criticism (and probably threats), Morris hastily re-invented himself as a hard-core, right-wing Zionist, fully supportive of transfer,There are some flaws, he never mentions the "Village Files" or the planning of the ethnic cleansing. Of the 400 towns and villages he names, he can't account for about 40 of them, but almost every one of the rest were evacuated by violence or the threat of violence.Morris claims that 5 villages and part of Haifa were emptied by the "orders of Arab leaders" (the Zionists used to make the ridiculous claim for the whole country). Nevertheless, Morris's claim for at least one of them (Sirin) is probably untrue - the villages may have left briefly in fear of an Arab "army" (band of robbers) but it was Israelis who destroyed this once beautiful village, which they've never re-settled.

lots of real facts and figures a bit too much for me quite a lot of information but very detailed especially showing the destruction of Palestinins before israel officially got the keys to its new land , but great insight into what happened to cause all the refugees

Benny Morris's aim was to find out exactly what caused the departure of 700,000 Palestinian Arabs from areas of British Mandate Palestine and subsequently the State of Israel in the years 1947-9. By dint of painstaking, detailed research he has made as good an effort as anyone is likely to achieve. The years in question saw the British mandate draw to a close as the conflict between Palestinian Arabs and Jews intensified into low-scale civil war. In May 1948 the British departed, the State of Israel was declared and it was immediately invaded its Arab neighbours. Israel won its War of Independence at great cost, but many Palestinian Arabs abandoned or were forced to abandon their homes and they refer to this period as `al-Nakba' or `catastrophe'.The author's sources were primarily the archives of the pre-State Yishuv, the Israeli, British, American governments and the UN. The expanded 2004 edition makes use of newly released information from Israeli cabinet protocols and Haganah / IDF archives. Documentation held by Arab states was not used as it's kept under lock and key due to the humiliating nature of their military defeat. Morris decided against using interview evidence from Jewish and Arab witnesses as decades had elapsed since the events and memories are often selected or distorted to fit a political narrative. The plentiful documentary evidence was deemed more reliable for the purpose of `establishing facts' and indeed this book is packed with detail.The book is not a comprehensive history of Israel's War of Independence and you'll have to refer elsewhere if you're interested in the military operations. Also, the important historical context leading up to the events of 1947-49 is not covered. The focus is very much on the national and local decisions, operations and circumstances that led to the exodus of Arab town dwellers and villagers.Ideally readers should be familiar with the geography of Palestine / Israel, because there are only three maps at the beginning of the book and it's difficult constantly to cross-refer to them from the text. Finding the location of an abandoned village involves searching through a long index in an untidy geographical order. This is the only practical weakness of the book. Small local maps should have been interspersed in the main body of text.As someone from the pro-Israel side of the fence, this book often made uncomfortable reading, but it's better to know the truth about what happened than be ignorant. Collective self-delusion in politics means people fail to understand the other side. I for one now better understand Palestinian historical grievances. Interestingly, much Western anti-Israel sentiment relates to the military takeover of the West Bank and Gaza in June 1967. But it's abundantly clear that in Palestinian minds, the events of 1947-9 are what really hurt, hence their long-term and probably unrealistic insistence on the `right of return'.For me, the biggest source of dismay was to read about the excesses of Jewish and Israeli forces during the war. Several small-scale atrocities and many other acts of brutality did occur in the course of the conflict. Sometimes the intention was to intimidate local Arabs into flight and sometimes revenge was the motive. There were also atrocities in the other direction, but generally the Israelis had the upper hand militarily and were in a position to expel Arab inhabitants from villages seen as a threat to Israeli forces and supply lines. Israel is a small country with long borders and few main roads so many villages fell into this category. That said, villages in areas away from the front lines, such as the western and central Galilee, were mostly left untouched. Often it depended whether a village was deemed hostile (usually, but not always Muslim) or friendly (often Christian, Druze or Circassian). For example, Nazareth back then was a Christian Arab town and was relatively unaffected by hostilities.Overall, Morris concludes that the reasons for Arab flight were mixed. There were many instances of Arabs leaving their homes following orders from the Arab Higher Committee or local Arab commanders. In towns such as Haifa, wealthy Arab families left early in the conflict, followed by community leaders and this weakened and demoralised the remaining population. Economic hardship and food shortages were a contributing factor. Many fled following word of real or alleged massacres by Jewish / Israeli forces. And many fled simply to escape fighting as Israeli forces clashed with the invading Arab armies and bands of local and foreign irregulars.A key question that Morris addresses is whether there was a `master plan' to expel Arabs from the territory of the future Jewish State. He concludes from the evidence that there definitely wasn't, but amongst most Israelis, including leaders such as Ben-Gurion, there was a tacit understanding that it was desirable not to have too large and threatening an Arab minority within the future state. Influential individuals such as Yosef Weitz, director of the JNF's Lands Department, argued for population transfer, but the final word usually rested with Ben-Gurion, who took a pragmatic line. He was mindful of world opinion and Israel's need for good relationships with the United States and other powers. Sometimes he gave verbal agreement to clearance operations like those at the strategic towns of Lydda and Ramle, but at other times he voiced restraint. When it came to decisions at the field command level, inconsistency ruled. There was no single, clear policy.Readers should bear in mind that the Palestinian Arab leadership and Arab League rejected the UN Partition Plan of November 1947, so they bear primary responsibility for the war and subsequent dislocation. For Israel this was a war of survival in which one out of every hundred Jews was killed. It took place just three years after the end of the Holocaust and many of its participants had been traumatised by their harsh experiences in Europe. Some, particularly in the Irgun and IZL saw this war as an extension of the struggle against the Nazis. The fact that the leader of the Palestinians, the Mufti of Jerusalem, had been an active supporter of Hitler and the Nazis didn't help their cause.If you're interested in this topic and are prepared for a long slog through detailed accounts of events, then this book is as thorough and authoritative as you can get.

This is a landmark study which killed off the old Zionist propaganda that the Palestinian refugee problem resulted from them following orders from their leaders to flee. No serious student of the Israel-Palestine conflict should ignore this work.What Morris proved is that for a variety of reasons but mainly because they were under military assault or otherwise in fear of their lives, over half the Palestinian Arab population fled (726,000 according to the UN). They had good reason to flee: where they attempted to stay they were often slaughtered and rape, torture and looting were widespread (Morris recounts the grisly case of an Arab who was required to clean the house in which Zionist soldiers had based themselves; when she had finished they shot her and her baby).However Morris claims that “The Palestinian refugee problem was born of war, not by design”. In other words there was no Jewish masterplan to expel the majority Arab population. What’s odd about this claim is that his book appears to prove the opposite.There’s little doubt the Jews wished to get rid of the Arabs. Ten years before the fighting started David Ben Gurion said "I support compulsory transfer. I don't see in it anything immoral." When he was told how many had remained in Nazareth he asked "Why did you not expel them?” and promised that Galilee would be “clean, empty of Arabs”.As Morris says “It was understood by all concerned that … the less Arabs remaining in the Jewish State, the better”.So they wished for it and they had a plan to do it (called Plan Dalet) and they did it. Again Morris tells us that no town was abandoned by its residents until it was attacked and that "it was standard Haganah and IDF policy to round up and expel the remaining villagers (usually old people, widows, cripples) from sites already evacuated by most of their inhabitants”. The brigade which attacked Haifa was ordered to “kill all males”. The town was shelled by mortars, even though there were no fighters in the town and the Jews knew this to be the case. David Ben Gurion on seeing the civilian population fleeing under shell fire said “What a beautiful sight”.Morris records all of this and yet concludes it was all a bit of a muddle in the heat of battle and no plan to expel Arabs ever existed. But those who left their homes were not permitted to return – surely expulsion by another name.A senior Mapam official wrote that "a deliberate eviction [of the Arabs] is taking place. . . out of certain political goals and not only out of military necessity”.A valuable book but one in which the author appears to (deliberately?) misinterpret his own evidence.