Cash on Delivery: CIA Special Operations During the Secret War in Laos (Paperback) - Common Paperback

Numerous books have appeared in the past 15-20 years about the CIA's so-called "secret war" in Laos-- including a recently declassified official Agency history. Insofar as I am aware, however, none of these have focused to any extent on operations in the southern Laos panhandle. Most of them dwell on the struggle up north for control of the Plain of Jars. And until this book, none provided a detailed breakdown of how the indigenous Lao guerrilla teams were organized, how their indigenous team leaders were selected, or on the day to day work of the CIA case officers who managed them. So Cash on Delivery gives us a fresh and unique look at the struggle for Laos. I appreciated it very much. The balance of the narrative focuses on the tactical day to day work carried out from Pakse Base to insert various types of indigenous Lao guerrilla teams into the Ho Chi Minh Trail for roadwatch, sabotage and prisoner-snatch operations. It's a fascinating read, relating the story of often mundane day to day case officer work but punctuated throughout by accounts of the grave dangers confronting CIA Paramilitary Case Officers (PMCOs) and also the personal bravery by those CIA Officers and their indigenous charges. It also details the exceedingly brave actions by contract personnel of the several Agency proprietary airlines, by US Air Force Ravens (forward air controllers), and by uniformed pilots and air crews of the US Air Force and Navy-- all working with CIA as one team in an effort to tie up mainforce North Vietnamese Army units and to interdict their resupply routes along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. And regardless of what anyone thinks about the effort in Laos, it was a resounding strategic success whereby no more than about 50 CIA officers and their indigenous Laotian tribal units led the effort to tie up two full People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) infantry divisions from 1961 until 1975. The CIA's very successful efforts in Laos only became untenable after the Nixon Administration signed the peace accord with Hanoi and withdraw its support for the South Vietnamese government. With the seizure of southern Vietnam by the PAVN in April 1975, the situation in Laos (and neighboring Cambodia) was no longer tenable.I think the level of detail on team organization, team numbering system and myriad landing, or "Lima" sites upcountry might quickly cause the eyes of the general reader to glaze over. For the student of counterinsurgency, or those of us with first-hand experience in Indochina, however, such detail is terribly interesting. Fortunately, the author includes a map of his theater of operations designating the locations of the action; without it, a general reader unfamiliar with the geography of Laos would quickly get lost.Of particular note are the several examples provided to illustrate how the author worked hard to improve intelligence collection during his tour in Laos. This is an important point, especially for the general reader, who might not be able to discern the difference between civilian paramilitary case officers of the CIA and the special forces of the Pentagon. The crystal clear difference always has been that while both are capable of training planning and executing special operations behind enemy lines, only CIA officers are specially trained and certified as Core Collectors. Thus, while they are training, they are also recruiting sources.The final chapter, "Speaking Truth to Power" hit home and I found myself agreeing with nearly all that the author has to say about senior management failures, a growing risk-averse culture at Langley, political interference and the creation of needless and mindless bureaucratic "reforms" (like the creation of the National Intelligence Director) that have not only failed to reform anything but have made things much much worse. I also agreed with the author's position on the purpose and role of CIA's Special Operations Group.My only disagreement lies with the author's contention that CIA mis-used its SOG teams in the opening volley of the War on Terrorism following 9-11-01. The author is correct that our Jawbreaker teams did take on the role normally reserved for US military special forces teams. But surely he knows that in the immediate aftermath of 9-11-01, the US military had no action plan to get its personnel inside Afghanistan, while CIA/SAD/SOG and CIA/CTC already had a plan on the shelf, enabling our PMCO's to insert and immediately begin organizing tribal resistance to the Taliban and Al Qaeda. It took the US Army weeks to get its teams even to the staging areas in the "stans" north of Afghanistan and then they discovered that their Army helicopters did not have the altitude or power to airlift the Army Triple Nickle teams over the Hindu Kush range and into the Panshir Valley. CiA, on the other hand, was equipped with Russian-built MI-17s-- a jet powered work horse with the ability to fly over the Hindu Kush. And in the end, CIA had to send its MI-17s out to pick up the Army special forces units and deliver them to theater. Were mistakes made? Sure, including some fatal ones. But the reality at the time was that when CIA had the only game-plan in town the President used his authority to send the CIA to war.The author may not have been in a position to know just how much angst this caused Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who had to sit and watch the military sit idly by on the sidelines for weeks while Agency personnel were already bringing the war to the enemy. But of this I am certain: Mr. Briggs, as a seasoned paramilitary operations officer, remembers the old saying that, "WHEN AMERICA IS IN PERIL, THE PENTAGON BEGINS PLANNING WHILE THE CIA GUYS GRAB A WEAPON AND JUMP ON THE TRUCK."My point is that CIA had the only viable Special Operations capability in Aghanistan in the early days. As time went on, the Agency PMCOs settled back into their traditional roles as program managers, training indigenous units, training indigenous police and the like-- and recruiting sources.There is some unnecessary redundancy throughout the book. The author explains that he wrote the book over many years, which partially explains these redundancies-- but a good edit and final proof would have eliminated this problem. Perhaps in the next edition?All in all this is a fine book and I would recommend it enthusiastically to anyone interested in the perspective of an experienced and respected CIA street officer. Clearly, as is often said inside the Velvet Prison, Tom Briggs was "one of us."

I enjoyed the book. Briggs was in Laos about the same time I was serving in Thailand. It was pretty much common knowledge that the road watch program was an exercise in futility. But, that's okay. The bigger question is "What did all the counting, recording, and reporting of supplies and NVA soldiers flowing in South Vietnam really achieve"?, And, the answer is nothing. We were getting our butts kicked. We lost that war. The NVA had been fighting long before we arrived on the scene, and they were in it as long as it took to win. We were not. Honestly, we don't have the stomach for war. We like to go in with a lot of noise and bluster, but we quickly tire of the effort, and just want to go home. Ho Chi Minh and General Giap were counting on just that response. And, they were right.As to the author's question regarding why we kept up the road watch progrm when we were collecing better intelligence electronically, the answer, I believe is simple. Had we not kept up the road watch program, the NVA would have known that we had discovered another way, and they would have perhaps developed a way to preclude us from success using our electronic means. It was common knowledge that the NVA had moles everywhere. They were in MACV, and they had moles on every installation in Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand. These moles provided the NVA almost real time Frag information on a daily basis. Every move we made was recorded, and reported to Hanoi.Thank you Mr. Briggs for providing this glimpse of the war as viewed through your eyes. You did a great job. Many POWs were left behind in Laos. But, we will not ever know the exact details of their demise. And, North Vietnam and the PDR aren't about to give that information up for fear that it will tarnish their image of opening up to the rest of the world. The bottom line is that they don't want negative press because it could affect their revenue from American tourists. The DIA, the Army, the Agency, and other U.S. Government entities collected extensive information on these guys who were left behind. But, that information will probably never be declassified. And ,we continued to collect information on that issue well into the 1980s. One of the Army's programs was called "Stoney Beach".

It is abundantly clear that this personal account of the secret CIA war in Laos was written by Briggs as accurately and as completely as the author could portray. I only wish this story could have been made known closer to real time more than 40 years ago, but I am glad it has finally been written for the good of posterity. I especially enjoyed reading the details of the shoot down and amazing recovery of Raven 42. This book will help people today to understand better what was really happening during the war in Southeast Asia which changed the lives of so many of us who had lived during that tumultuous time.

A solid book on an interesting topic.

As a master's degree student in Thai studies at Bangkok's Chulalongkorn University whose master's thesis is on the Laos war, I must recommend this book as one of the most gripping, knowledgeable, and articulate reads on the CIAs efforts there. The book provides key insights on the war, weaved into an exciting narrative that will leave you unable to put the book down. Congratulations Mr. Briggs for a great book!

I was in the area with a joint higher command at the time frame at least in part. I got to work with all sorts. Briggs nailed the Big Picture on the head, say, 100 percent. I am now in my seventies and retired from the business. It is tough to quit. I have to go back once more to see and walk the ground today. I spent a lot of time in Asia, but Laos got to me.

Tout ce qui concerne le Laos m'intéresse. Ce livre couvre une étape importante de l'histoire du pays. Les témoignages directs sont toujours utiles.