Campaign 129: Operation Barbarossa 1941 by Kirchubel, Robert [Osprey Publishing, 2003] (Paperback) [Paperback] Paperback

This a good, if very simple, overview of the operations of Army Group South from the beginning of Operation Barbarossa until the Soviet offensives in December 1941. It is a very thin volume that reads most times like a glorified encyclopedia entry but it gets the job done. There are almost no anecdotal elements here and not much in the way of analysis or discussion with the exception of a few major decisions made by the high commands of both sides. The maps are excellent and it is a quick read (93 pages). This volume, like most of the Osprey series, has the benefit of giving a quick, clear overview of the topic at hand but with little analysis. It reminds one of watery soup: there is some flavor but, to quote Sergeant Shultz in Stalag 17 “Where’s the ham hock?” That being said this book is useful if you are just starting out with the rabbit hole that is the Eastern Front or if you want to just brush up and have a quick reference guide for major operations. Anyone looking for something else will be disappointed.

Army Group South {AGS} was overall the most successfull of the 3 German army groups { A.G North, A.G Center, A.G. South} of Operation Barbarossa in 1941 in achieving its primary objectives. Considering the huge area frontage and multiple tasks it was assigned, Army Group South was by far the weakest of the 3 army groups with an initail invasion strenght of 38 divisions that would gradually increase to a maximum of 46 1/2 German divisions. As the campaign progressed Rumanian forces equall to about 14 divisions, 2 Hungarian, 2 Slovak and 3 Italian divisions would eventually bring AGS strenght to approximately 67 1/2 divisions.AGS was a multi-national force which greatly complicated it's command, control and logistical arrangements.The Red Army with 80-85 divisions initially greatly outnumbered the AGS forces and even though the Red Army continually suffered enormous losses, the Soviet state was ruthlessly able to mobilize massive manpower reserves to reinforce the front in far greater quanities than the Germans could. None of the satellite formations were up to German {or Russian} standards in training or equipment. On June 22, 1941 - In tanks, Army Group South was inititally outnumbered by about 5 to 1 { 3400 vs 660 }. By July 15, the Soviets armor were reduced to about 350 tanks - a loss rate of 90%. By contrast the Germans suffered a permenant loss of about 100 tanks. So, sheer numbers/quantities aren't the measure of an army's operational effectiveness as Mr. Kirchubel rather reluctantly chronicles in this decent campaign volume.In higher command leadership, troop training, armour and infantry tactical abilities, communications, mid-level command and control and combined army /airforce coordination - Army Group South despite equiptment and logistical shortcomings was able to inflict over 1.7 million permenant casualties {killed and captured} on the Red Army in the 1st six months of the campaign. Field Marshall von Rundstedt and his army commanders did a brilliant job in manuvering their limited forces to advance over 600 miles to Rostov and were finally to be stopped by troops losses and exhaustion ,an over extended frontage, logistical issues stemming from the sheer distances involved and finally the Russian winter.The Luftwaffe working in coordination with the armored spearheads deserve a great deal of credit in providing key air support and smashing Red Army reserves and counterattacks. Yet despite all its tactical success, Army Group South still had to face time and space limitations, supply problems ,wear and tear on the troops and equipment and the RUSSIAN WINTER !! Had Hitler and General von Halder allowed von Rundstedt to halt in late November {as he requested} to re-group and consolidate his forces defensively on the Dnieper River, it is very likely that Stalin's ham-fisted insistance that the Red Army attack, attack and ATTACK could have wrecked what was left of the Red Army facing Army Group South in futile counterattacks and Von Runstedt would undoubtly have been presented with new tactical opportunities to exploit.The overall performance by the Soviet high command, troop training and tactical performance by the Red Army can only be described as lamentable. The author's narrative tries to put a postive spin on the Red Armies combat performance and to overstate the damage it inflicted on German forces but does not make his arguments very convincing. The Red Army deployed huge #s of men and equiptment and some of its formations fought well. BUT when near1y one {1} million men are taken prisoner it is hard to credit that the Red Army fought with as much skill or detirmination as the author seems to want to make us believe.General Kirponos the front commander was a stubborn and dogged leader but his inexperience in going in less than 3 years from command of a division to the command of 6 + armies totaling 85 + divisions was much to big a jump for him to be an effective commander. His army commanders {with the possible exception of Tyulenev on the Odessa Front} were inferior in experience and tactical ability to the German army and corps commanders - in particular Panzer General Edward von Kleist. General Kirponos was hampered by Communist political commissar control {including a young Nikita Khurshchev} and Stalin's ignorant interferance espically in regards to allowing a withdrawal from Kiev before Kirponos armies were cutoff and surrounded.This criminal stupidity to make the Red Army stand and fight at Kiev led to what is arguably the greatest disaster in military history - the encirclement and destruction of six armies in the Kiev pocket {with the assistance of Panzer Group 2 from AG Center} with the Red Army losing nearly 1 million men {including between 550,000 to 650,000 + prisoners} including General Kirponos who perished while trying to break out of the encirclement.The military incompetence of Stalin and the Stavaka and immense losses of men and material suffered between June 22,1941 and Becember 31, 1941 only serve to show how remarkable the Red Army's winter recovery in 1941-42 was and even more remarkable were the tremendous victories it achieved in 1943 -45 - no other army could have {or ever has} sustained the losses that the Red Army suffered and was still remain in the field to win the war. Quoting Stalin " Quanitity has a Quality all it's own". Despite the author's [in my opinion} pro-Red Army slant,this book provides good maps and a decent overview of the first six months of AG South's campaign and I give it between a 3 1/2 and a 4 star rating.