The Specter of Communism: The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1917-1953 (Hill and Wang Critical Issues)

Melvyn P Leffler-The Specter of Communism: The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1917-1953 (Critical Issue) (Hill and Wang, 1994)The first year - 1917 - mentioned in the subtitle of Professor Leffer's slender volume, is the key to the understanding: The origins of the Cold War do not date from WWII, but from the end of WWI, more precisely, the separate peace treaty between Germany and Imperial Russia's successor, the revolutionary Soviet Union, of Brest-Litovsk.The subsequent siding of American expeditionary troops from Black Sea and far Eastern ports with the tsarist, ie anticommunist troops, the White Russians as against the Red Army of the Soviet Union (under Leon Trotsky) during the Russian Civil War (1917-22), has associated the US in the Russian mind as a thoroughly anti-soviet, reactionary and capitalist force.It should also be recalled that a number of independent countries - Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland - emerged from that war, curtailing Russian direct access to the Baltic.Note: "The specter of communism hangs over Europe" is the first sentence of Karl Marx' and Friedrich Engels' Communist Manifesto (London, 1848).obus4 - Leffler- Origins of the Cold War - 30/7/2012

In The Specter of Communism: The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1917-1953, Melvyn P. Leffler—professor of history, University of Virginia—provides a snapshot overview of US-Russian relations from the Bolshevik Revolution through the Korean War. This brief synopsis is likely to appeal to readers seeking a basic introduction to early Cold War history. Drawing predominantly from secondary sources, Leffler’s study does a good job of summarizing key developments that occurred during the period. That said, the author does not introduce anything groundbreaking to the field, and often does an inadequate job of providing citations in support of his claims. Although the book offers little for historians of the Cold War, it is a good primer for the introductory reader interested in learning how various geopolitical events influenced hostility between nations.Leffler traces the beginning of US-Russian tension to the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. President Woodrow Wilson was agitated by the Bolsheviks for three reasons: (1) their repudiation of former Russian debts to the United States, (2) their removal of Allied war supplies from the key port of Archangel in the White Sea, and (3) Lenin’s dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, which was the most democratically elected body in Russian history. Influenced by these factors, Wilson refused to recognize the newly formed government.Relations improved slightly under President Warren Harding who, along with then-Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover, organized a major effort to distribute food aid to Russia in 1922 during the widespread famine that claimed the lives of three million to five million people. Partially influenced by this gesture, Lenin began to institute new economic policies, encouraging mutually beneficial investment from American businessmen. However, Lenin’s initiatives gradually gave way to a command economy based on forced industrialization, and internal Soviet disputes resulted in a power struggle that witnessed the emergence of Stalin as the dominant leader.Shortly after taking office, FDR opened diplomatic relations with Russia, becoming the first US president to formally recognize the Soviet Union. Initially ushered into office on his domestic platform, FDR shifted his focus toward foreign affairs in response to German and Japanese aggression abroad. The president viewed Germany as an incomparably greater threat to national security than Russia, and chose to support Stalin following Hitler’s repudiation of the Nazi-Soviet pact and subsequent invasion of the USSR in June 1941.Although the US-Russian alliance was a vital success throughout World War II, it proved formidable in the early postwar period. However, according to Leffler, Stalin’s initial approach to international affairs at this time was cautious, as he sought to sustain the wartime alliance upon which Soviet postwar reconstruction depended. As a result, he discouraged revolutionary action in France, Italy, Spain, and Greece in 1944-45 to avoid provoking a US backlash. Additionally, the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki put the Kremlin on the defensive. Although remaining active in Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria, Stalin moved cautiously outside the eastern bloc.Upon assuming power following FDR’s death, Truman also sought cooperation with the Russians—but on his terms. Truman and his advisors believed Soviet expansion was not permissible beyond the existing borders. Leffler claims that Truman was “predisposed to a tough policy” toward the Russians, a view only reinforced by George Kennan’s long telegram and Churchill’s “iron curtain” speech in 1946. The Truman Doctrine, aid to Turkey and Greece, and the Marshall Plan were all significant developments of the Cold War advanced by Truman. In response to these initiatives, Stalin reestablished the Comintern in September 1947 to help quell what he perceived as US attempts to establish economic and political dominance throughout Europe. Through the Comintern, Stalin sought to utilize foreign Communist parties to advance Russian interests abroad. If Communists could rise to power in France, Italy, and Greece, the Kremlin could bind their economies to the Soviet Union and slowly gain strength on the global stage. Stalin simultaneously began to tighten his grip over Eastern Europe.A major turning point in the Cold War was the Czechoslovakian coup that resulted in a Communist dictatorship in the spring of 1948. This outcome shocked US officials and highlighted the importance of bolstering democratic forces abroad. Soviet aggression would influence the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, a peacetime military alliance between the United States and friendly European nations. In April 1950, Kim Il-sung of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea sought and received assistance from Russia and China to invade South Korea in hopes of unifying the peninsula under DPK control. Truman was determined to stop the aggression following the outbreak of war in June, and ordered US troops to the region without congressional approval. The Korean War ultimately strengthened and expanded NATO, as it highlighted the threat of worldwide Communist expansion. As a result, Greece and Turkey were brought into the Western alliance.Additionally, the war influenced the US decision to negotiate an agreement with Japan that would restore the nation’s sovereignty in hopes of pacifying anti-occupation fervor. According to Leffler, US officials considered Japan the most valuable country in Asia because of its industrial potential and work force. As a result, Truman could not allow the nation to fall to Communist influence, especially in the wake of the Chinese Revolution and aggression in Korea. His administration was convinced that the region would be lost unless Japan could rely on non-Communist markets in Southeast Asia. The focus of US policymakers then gravitated to developments in Indochina. Leffler ends his study at this point in history, setting the stage for the proxy war in Vietnam.Although the author provides a good foundation for the study of the Cold War, his scholarship suffers from a lack of citations in support of arguments. For example, Leffler claims that “[e]laborate studies undertaken jointly by the State Department and Council on Foreign Relations in New York demonstrated that the American political economy … could not survive in a world divided into economic blocs dominated by totalitarian governments” (loc. 473, Kindle ed.). However, the author does not provide the reader with a reference to these studies or others mentioned throughout the book.In sum, Leffler has constructed a solid primer for readers seeking an introduction to early Cold War history. However, the text fails to offer a fresh perspective on the conflict, as its primary purpose is apparently to provide a brief summary of US-Russian relations from 1917 to 1953. Additionally, a lack of references and documentation in support of many of the author’s claims is likely to frustrate readers seeking to further their analysis and understanding of the period.

A bit dry, but we'll researched.

Weird reading but it's really good on giving information about the U.S. during the Cold War

Melvyn Leffler's "The Specter of Communism" is a superb, short, and nuanced history of the origins of the Cold War. It should be assigned reading in any college course on 20th century American foreign policy.In Leffler's telling, Stalin felt vulnerable after World War II and wanted to preserve good relations with the U.S. The Soviet dictator insisted, however, on moving his borders westward, installing a puppet regime in Poland, and playing a leading role in the occupation of Germany and Japan. These goals didn't necessarily clash with core U.S. interests and might not have resulted in a Cold War if Europe and East Asia hadn't been on the verge of collapse after 1945. Since World War I, Washington had been haunted by the fear that the resources of Europe and Asia might fall under the control of one hostile power -- either Germany or Russia -- that could then threaten the security and political economy of the U.S. Washington policymakers didn't think that Stalin planned to start a new war, but they panicked when communist parties surged in France, Italy and elsewhere. Assuming that communist governments would link their economies to the USSR's, Washington responded by moving to rebuild the German economy and integrating Germany into a U.S.-led European bloc. Stalin, fearing a revival of German power, clamped down on Eastern Europe and blockaded Berlin. The Cold War was soon going at full steam.One of the high points of Leffler's book is the discussion of the domestic politics of anti-communism. American conservatives didn't give a hoot about Europe or foreign policy; however, they did want to exploit anti-Red feeling in order to discredit New Dealers and crack down on labor unions and civil rights groups. But having stirred up a lot of paranoia, conservatives were outflanked when the Truman Administration tapped these same sentiments to win support for expensive plans to rearm the U.S. and rebuild Europe! Thus the Great Bipartisan Compromise of the 1950s and '60s was born: an anti-Soviet foreign policy was married to crude Red Baiting at home.Leffler writes clearly, understands the policy environment of Washington, and doesn't accept the prevailing (and idiotic) myth that U.S. foreign policy is generally well-informed or motivated by moral considerations. On the contrary, the U.S. policymakers of the late 1940s were more-or-less amoral and sometimes poorly informed about foreign countries. (American foreign policy can be Machiavellian and inept at the same time.) "The Specter of Communism" is history at its best.