Operation Barbarossa: Hitler's Invasion of Russia 1941 Paperback – October 1, 2011

I wanted a short, compact history book on this topic that I could read on the train, and I was impressed by what I got for roughly $3 (new) plus shipping. This book is a tremendous value, and to date the best one-volume account of Barbarossa that I have read.I have read Glantz's before, and either my tastes have changed, or this book was unlike the Glantz that I thought I knew. It's an operational military history of the Eastern Front, and by now, few, if anyone, can write these types of books on this topic better than Glantz.I found the prose descriptions very clear, and in 206 pages of narrative, Glantz covers the many battles that occurred with concision and insight. His best, most original research is on the Soviet side; that said, he covers the German side with equal balance. While his archival or Russian-language source material access is always impressive, I was a little surprised that he relied on standard accounts of the German side (Ziemke and Bauer, Seaton, with some Halder and other memoirs thrown in.).I won't recount the entire campaign here, but some highlights of Glantz's account are worth mentioning. Glantz recognizes the shortcomings of how both sides fought the war. While the Germans started strong and ended much weaker, the Soviets started weak and ended stronger (albeit perhaps only marginally so, and relative to German weakness).He blames Stalin for the purges and the unfinished reorganization that caught the Red Army flat-footed at the campaign's opening and resulted in many needless, catastrophic defeats. He also says that the constant Soviet counterattacks were "suicidal" but weakened the Germans as they got deeper and deeper into the country. Throughout, command and control was a serious issue for the Soviets, and Stalin's frequent requests for counterstrokes were carried out in a seemingly haphazard fashion.His final analysis of why the campaign turned out the way it did is strikingly similar to Seaton's. Glantz seems to understand that fundamental historical question of this campaign is how much the Germans contributed to their own defeat or how much the Soviets were responsible for their victory. Surprisingly perhaps, given his closeness to Soviet sources, Glantz seems to come down in the camp that it was the German's battle to lose. As he sums it up, "Inevitably, the dull bludgeon representing the mobilized mass Soviet Army blunted the surgically precise, deadly, but fragile rapier thrusts that the German Army relied on to power Blitzkrieg War." Glantz, citing Heinrici's analysis (which I had not seen before elsewhere), says that the Germans were defeated by the terrain in a backwards country by a more brutal dictator. Glantz is not as condescending as Seaton, but the echoes are there. Orginally written in 2001, one wonders if Glantz's perceptions have changed since then.He does acknowledge that the Germans ruined their chances by harsh occupation policies, which in turn sparked partisan uprisings that in turn threatened the already delicate German logistical lifelines. The Wehrmacht, he notes, was better suited to fight in Western Europe than the Soviet Union; however, this only goes so far in that the steppes were ideal for tanks while the roads were terrible for trucks. That said, he (again like Seaton) doesn't investigate why the Germans were ill-equipped for the sub-freezing winter, which resulted in pointless, probably avoidable frostbite casualties. While the Soviet's Moscow counterattack is expertly told, with a focus on blunting the German spears around Kalinin and Tula, little is made of the partisan-airborne action behind German lines, even though this is shown on a map. Somehow, these gaps didn't bother me as much, probably because Glantz investigates the Soviet side and holds up their mistakes to scrutiny. Also, he covers so much in 206 pages that some gaps seem inevitable, and thus forgiveable.Glantz also enters the debate around Hitler's decision to send troops away from Moscow to Kiev and Leningrad in August 1941. An immediate attack on Moscow at that time instead of Kiev may not have succeeded anyway. The Soviet forces in front of Moscow were stronger, at least until they counterattacked at Smolensk, where they were critically weakened. Furthermore, if the Germans hadn't destroyed Southwestern Front in the Kiev battle, those same forces could have attacked Guderian's wing when it attacked Moscow. Thus, it turns out that the Germans' best chance to take Moscow (he argues) was in October after all, when the Soviets had been worn down in the summer. In a few concise, devastating paragraphs, Glantz is able to put that particular what-if to rest. Or he at least tries to.I found the maps, which focus on armies and army groups, clear and excellent; I just wish there were more of them. For example, detailed maps at the corps or divisional level showing the fighting around Leningrad, Smolensk, and Kiev (parallel to the Moscow maps) would have helped in those chapters. His footnotes and bibliography are also informative, and I found myself flipping to them often for his asides and color commentary. Directives from OKW and Stavka also form an interesting appendix, even though key passages are quoted in the main text.All in all, I found this to be a readable, interesting, riveting description of the military events on the Eastern Front. If I had to pick one volume as a recommendation to anyone interested in the topic, this would be it.

This is a good but select overview of Operation Barbarossa. While there is one chapter of the German drive toward Leningrad and another chapter on its drive toward Rostov in the south, the major emphasis covers the advance of AGC toward Moscow as well as the Soviet counter-attack that repulses the Germans from entering the capital in December 1941. It also emphasizes Guderian's 2nd PzG's march south in September to assist Rundstedt's AGS in closing the Kiev pocket. Some of the battles of AGC include the capture of Minsk, Smolensk, Kiev pocket, Vyazma, Bryansk, Orel, Mozhaisk, Kaluga, Kalinin and the attempt on Moscow. It also shows that with so much armor with AGC, the flanks had a difficult time taking Leningrad and Rostov.The objective of the author is more than describing the introductory status and conditions of the two sides and the military highlights of the Operation; the strategic significance of the book is to show the Germans were able to advance and destroy Soviet armies at first but by December 41 when it reached the Leningrad, Moscow, Rostov line, it had reached its zenith, had exhausted itself and didn't have enough men and panzers to finish off the Soviets. By the time it reached Moscow their own large casualties and the extended line prevented the capture of Moscow and through implication that the Germans actually lost their chance to defeat the Soviet Army. An important element within this overview was the author's coverage of the controversy within the German ranks of rather it should go straight on to Moscow from Smolensk or delay AGC's advance and have Guderian divert to Kiev to relieve flank pressure before moving on the capital.Mr Glantz covers the actual historiography in some detail on the advantages and disadvantages of taking Kiev first before moving on Moscow but then only briefly states the general reasons why going straight on to Moscow in late September when the Western Front was preparing defenses was the wrong strategy and gives little hard core numbers or other facts to support this contention. You are to accept his word as accurate during the narrative though some of his supporting material can be found in the Endnotes but it can be a trying process to navigate for the casual reader.The author's presentation of the Kiev first strategy may be more convincing to hardcore contrarians if a credible scenario could have been developed showing the Moscow first strategy failed worse than the Kiev first strategy. The scenario would begin showing 2nd PzG defending near Roslavl through 9/10 and launching with AGC toward Bryansk after Timoshenko canceled his offensive. The time sequence of this new scenario would be somewhat different than actual history due to different launch times and locations, strength status, defense preparations and deployments as well as different reinforcement schedules and weather etc.The conclusion was short but credible and was the glue that binds this book together. It started by explaining why the Soviets were completely unprepared for the invasion: the recent purges, poorly trained soldiers, inexperienced officers, inadequate defenses at the new border and obsolete weapons and equipment. Mr Glantz proceeds to list the many strategic mistakes Stalin and the Red Army made in the opening months. Then a list of changes the Stavka started to implement to improve their Army that would eventually lead them to be the equal and then surpass the Wehmarcht is provided.On the German side, a concise discussion of Hitler's changing objectives of Operation Barbarossa that would delay the advance of Moscow and cause friction within the Army is prominent. The author expands this train of thought to briefly describe the difficulties AGC would have had if it did advanced past the Desna River toward Moscow in September without ever sending Guderian southward. The chapter was concise and covered the key points but greater depth of the existing points (as mentioned above would have made the book more compellng.There are eight useful B+W maps that show the general deployments and axes of attack that complement the narrative well. Since this is not a tactical reconstruction like the author's Barbarossa Derailed series or his Stalingrad series, the author didn't feel it necessary to have many maps.The Notes Section is very useful and provides a lot of secondary information if you take the time to study it. The included Appendix has Orders of Battle and key documents like Hitler's Directive 34 and 35 to study. A Bibliography and a few photos are included as well.As a summary, I gave this book five stars for it covered the necessary points to argue his position that despite the early successes, the Germans were unable to defeat the Soviets while they were vulnerable and that in a long war of attrition, Germany couldn't defeat the larger, improving colossus that was the Soviet Army.Though enjoying the book and freely recommend it, I found myself and suspect other enthusiasts of the Eastern Front will want more after finishing the book. The author's new book, "Barbarossa Derailed" does add to the key points of this book in a limited fashion and is also recommended as is Bryan Fugate's "Operation Barbarossa".

A good overview of Barbarossa. I got a lot of information from the Russian perspective that I have missed in other books on this subject.Highly Recommend

This was an interesting read, covering the initial phases of Operation Barbarossa, effectively until the end of the 1941 campaign season when the Wehrmacht's advance ground to a halt in the snows of the Russian winter. The book gives a useful overview of the campaign and sits very much at the operational/strategic level, with much detail of the ebb and flow of the respective forces at army, corps and divisional level. For me, here lies the book's greatest weakness as there is frequent reference to numbered formations (divisions, corps and armies) and their commanders and it is impossible to keep on top of who is doing what to whom. The maps, as with the Kindle version (I gather), are at the back of the book so one has to keep referring there to try and get a visual feel for what is going on. And the simple fact is that these are large scale maps showing the broad sweep of the invasion, so often the necessary detail is missing. Nonetheless, overall Glantz does a good job of depicting the general picture of the initial successes of the Wehrmacht and how it starts to slow down in the face of Russian geography, poor logistics support and the simple belligerence of the Russians in resisting the Nazi onslaught. The book also highlights the strengths and weaknesses of the opposing sides, through well-considered conclusions and summaries, and makes all too clear the Soviet stavka's constant (and unhelpful) interference and the continuous reorganisation of fronts,army groups and armies. In particular, the final conclusion provides a superb overview of 'why it went wrong' for the Germans who based their offensive and expectation of success on a doctrine (blitzkrieg) which, arguably, was never going to work on the vast areas of the western Soviet Union, and how they had become victims of their own mythologising of that doctrine.

This is more in the vein of an academic review so if you are looking for something that desribes the 'action' in detail then this is not the book for you.There is obviously a large amount of detailed research behind the finished version and it is interesting to understand the approach that both sides took to the conflict.Overall an interesting and informative read

A much better insight into this event

Excellent,thank you.

An excellent description of Hitler's campaign against Stalin. The Kindle edition suffers from having all the maps at the end of the text. Reading the book with simultaneous access to Google Earth proved a great advantage. What would now be interesting would be to read the story from the point of view of one or more of the soldiers involved.Thoroughly recommended.