The Cyprus Problem: What Everyone Needs to Know®

The Cyprus Problem by James Ker-Lindsay is concise about the divided island’s history before and after 1960 independence. Before 1960, Britain was the island’s colonial master. The island wasn’t allowed to join the Greek nation. After independence, a small nation was created with two languages, Greek and Turkish, two religions, Greek Orthodox and Sunni Islam, two ethnic histories, Greek and Turkmen, and a long geographic enmity between islands and mainland going back at least to the Trojan Wars.Ker-Lindsay’s main theme is showing how these divides have kept Cyprus from achieving a workable self-government. While reading about Cyprus, he got me thinking about small European nations with problems in self-government, Belgium and Ireland. Belgium’s Flemish/French language problem in self-government seems bad, even without two ethnic histories, nor two religions, and Belgium isn’t an island physically outside its larger European community. Cyprus clearly has more problems than Belgium, and more than Ireland, which it resembles in being an island. Ireland’s religious division is only between denominations of the Christian religion, and both use the same Holy book. Ireland’s Gaelic language is mitigated by general use of English. Ireland’s history of geographic enmity goes back 500 years, not thousands of years. So I see Ker-Lindsay’s Cyprus as a more comprehensive study of problems in Mediterranean self-government.Ker-Lindsay describes problems from each side. There were personality clashes between party leaders who didn’t really represent the desires of their populations. Popular referendums were tried in attempts to bypass these leaders, but the populations were easily pushed and pulled by media campaigns. New confederations were proposed in attempts to bypass clashes over which group would lead a continuing nation of 1960 Cyprus, but they were seen as preludes to easy secession from confederation. Ideas for rotating or sharing power at the top didn’t satisfy either group’s fundamental desire to wield power over the opposing population. The border between the populations is physically vague, yet legislative attempts failed to set a firm border. Outsiders tried to mediate between the groups, but there was no trust. Trust in a combined national government is lacking in the partitions: the government isn’t trusted to prevent subversion of one partition by the other, and the government isn’t trusted to handle external relations with Greece and Turkey without favoring one partition over the other.Ker-Lindsay says he has no solution to offer. He feels the 2004 entry of Cyprus into the European Union may help lead out of the impasse, but he observes that Turkey’s delay entering the European Union has been delaying the effect. He got me thinking again. Maybe both Cypriot groups, now clashing over who will be on top of their island, might accept a third and better answer, neither of them. It wouldn’t be the first “partitions smaller, community larger” success. America’s states put political and religious differences under common defense, diplomacy, and treasury. In a large community, immigration can be shared, new religions accepted, and children educated in a shared language for interstate commerce. Europe is already years along a similar path.He got me thinking parts of the Mediterranean might enter onto similar paths. Until then, Ker-Lindsay’s Cyprus descriptions, written before the 2011 Arab Spring, seem able to predict and explain problems in small Mediterranean attempts at democratic self-government. All have minorities unable or unwilling to accept majority rule while living near the majority. Ker-Lindsay’s insights into the Cyprus problem might help others understand their small nation failures. They might seek, as Ker-Lindsay suggests, larger communities taking away from both minority and majority the divisive roles of defense and diplomacy. As small partitions in a larger community, their repeating Mediterranean clashes would lose weight, even while historic enmity continued.Bottom line: Ker-Lindsay earns 5 stars. He understands the Mediterranean better than diplomats who think talk ends tribalism. He thinks mutual benefit trumps tribalism.

The promotional material for the book is reassuring. It informs us that "Ker-Lindsay is considered one of the world's experts on the subject of Cyprus and its `problem'," and promises us an incisive, even-handed account containing, it is implied, accurate and impartial information. Apparently, before the publication of this book, "accurate and impartial information on the conflict" was "nearly impossible to obtain", but it can now, presumably, all be found in this little book. Well, maybe not all--just all that everyone needs to know.Here is a sample of the even-handedness, accuracy and impartiality on offer:In August, the United Kingdom invited Greece and Turkey to attend a conference on peace and security in the eastern Mediterranean. Although not directly stated, the real purpose of the event, to discuss Cyprus, was well known. It was an important moment. Britain now appeared to admit that Cyprus was not purely an internal matter after all. Instead, it directly involved the two countries, which were widely perceived by the Greek and Turkish Cypriots to be their `motherlands'. However, Makarios was furious about the invitation to Turkey. He accused London of reigniting a Turkish interest in Cyprus thirty years after Ankara had given up its claim to Cyprus under the Treaty of Lausanne and refused to attend. The talks went ahead anyway but were beset by violent anti-Greek riots in the Turkish cities of Istanbul and Izmir. The conference soon broke down. (pp. 22-23)Four points need to be made with regard to this passage:(1) The "real purpose of the event" was not "to discuss Cyprus", but to use Turkish opposition to Cyprus' liberation to make Greece back down. "Throughout the negotiations our aim would be to bring the Greeks up against the Turkish refusal to accept enosis and so condition them to accept a solution which would leave sovereignty in our hands." So said Defence Minister Selwyn Lloyd to Cabinet, and to achieve its aims Britain encouraged Turkey to be intransigent: "Eden let it be known to the British Embassy in Ankara that he was sure it was `in our interest' if Turkey spoke out on the issue, even if this meant being rigid and `violently' anti-Greek at the conference." ( The Cyprus Conspiracy: America, Espionage and the Turkish Invasion  by Brendan O'Malley & Ian Craig, pp.21 & 22)(2) Makarios did not refuse to attend the conference. It was a tripartite conference and Cypriots were not invited.(3) It was not just Makarios who accused the British Government of "reigniting a Turkish interest in Cyprus thirty years after Ankara had given up its claim to Cyprus under the Treaty of Lausanne". Any number of commentators have with justice made the same accusation. For one of the most recent see Robert Ellis' "The scandalous history of Cyprus" (The Guardian 3 March 2010. Also at [...]It is telling that Ker-Lindsay chooses to put a valid criticism of the British Government in the mouth of a "furious" Makarios refusing to participate in the "discussion". The unstated understanding towards which we are guided by Ker-Lindsay's phrasing and selection of detail goes something like: "Of course, being furious and therefore in an unreasonable frame of mind, he would say something like that out of of pique."(4) Ker-Lindsay's most startling omission is his reference to "violent anti-Greek riots in the Turkish cities of Istanbul and Izmir." As any expert on Cyprus would know, these were not simply "anti-Greek riots", they were planned and orchestrated attacks against a minority community disguised as spontaneous riots, and their primary aim was to demonstrate the "Turkish public's" strength of feeling on the Cyprus issue, and put Greece on the back foot at the conference. There are at least two extensive studies of the "riots" with detailed and reliable documentation: one is in  In Turkey's Image: The Transformation of Occupied Cyprus into a Turkish Province (Subsidia Balcanica, Islamica and Turcica, 4th)  by Christos P. Ioannides (New York: Aristide D. Caratzas, 1991); the other is  The Mechanism of Catastrophe: The Turkish Pogrom Of September 6 - 7, 1955, And The Destruction Of The Greek Community Of Istanbul  by Speros Vryonis Jr. (Greekworks, 2005).There is a world of difference between spontaneous expressions of public anger and planned violence against a minority community orchestrated by the government. It is not dissimilar to the difference between accurate impartial information and disinformation. Here is an alternative account of the "anti-Greek riots". Draw your own conclusions:"In September 1955, as Cyprus was being discussed at a three-power conference in London, the Turkish secret police planted a bomb at the house where Kemal Ataturk was born in Salonica. At the signal of this `Greek provocation', mobs swarmed through Istanbul looting Greek businesses, burning Orthodox churches, and attacking Greek residents. Although no one in official circles in London doubted that the pogrom was unleashed by the Turkish government, Macmillan - in charge of the talks - pointedly did not complain. ("The Divisions of Cyprus" by Perry Anderson in London Review of Books vol. 30, no. 8, 24 April 2008, pp. 7-16. Also at [...], and in  The New Old World .

Had to read this book for a class on international identity based conflicts. The book was easy to read and enjoyable. Read it in one day and thought is was informative and approaches a dense controversial subject in a relatively neutral manner. Asks the good questions and provides thought-provoking answers!

This book provides a clear outline of the events that led to the division of Cyprus, and the issues surrounding reunification. A good read for those who are unaware, yet wanting to understand the roots of the conflict.

Very good to get going and get the basics but surely needs more to go more in depth and truly understand

Informative.

As the subtitle says: What everyone needs to know.Good and unbiased intro on the subject (which otherwise is obscured by a lot of biased contributions, from both the conflict parties themselves and a bunch of other sources linked to them in one or the other way).

Good and informative.

Not bad as an introductory overview for someone not already acquainted with the topic but not quite 'what everyone needs to know.'One part in particular that stands out as inadequate is the chapter on what life was like under the British. As a liberal minded Englishman I have always been embarrassed by the destructive role our government played in its colonies across the globe and our contribution in Cyprus was decisive. The significance of Britain's contribution to the creation and perpetuation of the Cyprus problem has been well documented by several other British historians and journalists of note including Anderson, Hitchens, Clogg, Woodhouse and others. Britain to this day retains some 5% of the island as "sovereign" territory.

Easy to read. Highlights the power wielded by the few over the many, and the folly of the decisions made by those few over time.

It's well known now, after US official documents have recently become available to the public, that Henry Kissinger was heavily compliant with Turkey's intention to annex a part of Cyprus. To say that there 'is 'a weight of evidence to the contrary' of any UK/US conspiracy is incorrect, especially as no evidence was provided. The book lost its credibility from that point.

Excellent summary of a complex and contentious issue that manages to balance accessibility with a balanced and meaningful portrayal. The structure - a chronological outline followed by a focus on some of the key themes and issues - gives both context and understanding.

Great concise history for a misunderstood situation